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The impact of massive migration flow on 
regional population structure: The case of Italy 
Antonio Golini and Anna Di Bartolomeo* 
Abstract 
Low economic growth rates are a common problem in many developed countries 
in Europe. This paper aims to highlight the possible role of demographic factors. 
Problems of low growth may be exacerbated by an increase in dependency ratios. 
However, large-scale migrations have been shown to positively affect the age 
composition of a population. Focusing on Italy, we estimate the impact of 
migration on the working age population ratio, population size and gross domestic 
product. We also show that migration may affect the economic gap between the 
North and South, posing a new potential problem to policymakers. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Economic growth rates in many of Europe’s developed countries have remained 
rather low, particularly in Italy (OECD 2008). This performance has generated a 
great debate mainly centred upon the effects of productivity growth, capacity 
utilisation and rigid institutions, especially in labour markets (see e.g. Hall and 
Jones 1999; Picci 1999; Aiello and Scoppa, 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Leoni 
2007).1 Low productivity ranks consistently among the usual suspects for low 
growth; however, it alone cannot fully explain the observed negative outcomes. 
For instance, it has been noted that the same technologies driving growth in the 
United States are also available in developed European countries, yet the two 
regions’ growth rates remain very different. Alesina and Zeira (2006), argue that 
there are different incentives for introducing capital-saving technologies in the 
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two regions due to different labour costs that ultimately depend on different state 
welfare systems. As a result, Europe experiences low growth rates due to low 
investment in capital-saving innovations, which are currently the engine of 
growth in other advanced economies.  
Furthermore, the search for additional factors driving economic change has 
led scholars’ to a study of the role of population dynamics in economic growth 
and inequality. Historically, three contrasting theories have been developed, 
supported by many empirical studies: population growth may spur, diminish or be 
independent of economic growth. In recent years, attention has shifted to the 
impact of age structure, since people’s economic behaviours and needs differ 
according to their life stage (Bloom et al. 2003). Recent empirical studies have 
confirmed that decreases in youth dependency ratios have a positive effect on 
economic growth both in developing and developed countries (see among others 
Bloom et al. 2003; Bloom et al. 1999; Kelley and Schmidt 1995; Kelley and 
Schmidt 2001; Prskawetz et al. 2004). Moreover, some scholars have 
demonstrated a significant relationship between age structure and economic 
growth, inflation and savings in OECD countries (Lindh and Malmberg 1999). 
Bloom et al. (2007) demonstrated that the addition of age structure may 
significantly improve long-run economic growth forecasts in cross-sectional 
growth models. Finally, Higgins and Williamson (1999) found evidence of an 
inverse relationship between the percentage of mature working-age adults (aged 
40 59) and income inequality.  
 This paper aims to highlight the role of demographic factors, particularly 
international migration, in diluting the old-age dependency ratio and thus, 
supporting economic growth. The hypothesis is that large-scale migration can 
lead to changes in age structure, a potential determinant of economic growth 
(ECB 2006; United Nations 2007). 
 The impact of demographic factors can be approached using the following 
GDP decomposition: 
 (1) 
 In Equation (1) above, GDP refers to Gross Domestic Product, Employed 
indicates the number of employed individuals, L refers to the working age 
population and Pop to the total population. Therefore, the Gross Domestic 
Product is defined as a simple function of (from left to right) labour productivity 
(GDP per employed), the employment rate, the working age population ratio and 
the total population.  
 The impact of total and working age population ratio on GDP can be 
measured by holding the long-run natural rate of employment and productivity 
constant. Under these conditions the positive relationships between a) the GDP 
and the working age population ratio and b) the GDP and the population are 
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negligible.2 Migration has a clear impact on the working age population ratio and 
total population size; thus according to the above identity, changes in migration 
will lead to changes in GDP. Indeed, according to identity (1), labour migrations 
will more likely spur economic activity under the following conditions: a) 
immigrant labour is largely complementary and not in competition with local 
labour; b) immigrants are quickly employed; and c) immigrants have at least the 
same level of productivity as natives. Identity (1) can also be transformed to 
evaluate the impact of the working age population ratio on per-capita income, by 
ignoring the negligible relationship between GDP and population and highlighting 
the impact of structural factors.3  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the 
research hypotheses; Section 3 describes data and methods; Section 4 presents the 
results; and Section 5 concludes with discussion and implications.  
 
 
2  Research hypotheses 
Several recent studies have attempted to estimate the demographic impact of 
migrants. When flows are low, studies have mainly demonstrated that migration 
does not significantly impact age structure. While low migration flows may thus 
do little to stop population ageing (Golini et al. 1995; Lesthaeghe et al. 1988; 
Lambert 2008); evidence suggests that it can at least partially delay this 
phenomenon (Leridon 2000). At the same time, many scholars have stressed the 
positive impact of migration on national economies, if international migration 
flows are accompanied by rational migratory policies that consider the size and 
age structure of labour migration flows (Blanchet 1988 and 2002; IMF 2004). In 
order to derive economic benefit, these flows have to be composed of labour 
migrants, quantitatively significant (Blanchet 2002; Dekle 2004; United Nations 
2001), and directed by migratory policies which are intertwined with family and 
social policies (Kohli 2008). In an articulate report, Prskawetz et al. (2007) also 
highlight migrants’ significant contribution to per-capita income growth in 
industrialised countries with a positive current net migration. In Italy, 
Unioncamere (2008) estimates that migrants contribute greatly to the national 
                                                 
2  The demographic issue is particularly relevant in Italy, where productivity has grown very 
slowly over the past 20 years and there has been little variability in the unemployment rate. The 
average productivity growth rate over the 20-year period from 1987 to 2007 was 1.03% per 
year, while the average unemployment rate from 1998 to 2008 was 1.49% per year (Istat 2009). 
It is worth noting that due to the labour market reforms of the 1990s, there was a significant 
reduction in the unemployment rate. However, there was also a corresponding change in the 
composition of the employed portion of the population, with an increase in part-time workers 
and other flexible forms of work. 
3  Using a logarithmic transformation it is also easy to transform the decomposition from levels to 
growth rates. 
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GDP (9.2% in 2006); in some northern regions (e.g. Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia 
Romagna and Umbria), this contribution reaches 11.0%.  
 This paper aims to ascertain whether labour migrations may be considered a 
resource in supporting the Italian working age population ratio, population size 
and potentially, the gross domestic product. By doing this, two research 
hypotheses, corresponding to two levels of analysis (aggregate and disaggregate), 
have been developed and tested.  
 At an aggregate level, we hypothesise that massive labour migration flows 
may positively impact the working age population ratio, population size and, 
ceteris paribus, the GDP. In fact, despite strong debate over the impact of 
migrants on population age structure, this hypothesis is based on two factors 
specific to the Italian demographic situation. First, rapid population ageing would 
imply a strong reduction in GDP as it tends to lower the working age population 
ratio.4 Second, very low fertility is expected to have an impact on the working age 
population ratio (see e.g. Golini 1998a; Billari et al. 2002; Billari and Kohler 
2004) leading to an inability of young workers to support an increasingly large 
dependent elderly population. In this context, massive labour migration flows 
may supplement the diminishing working age population, thereby increasing the 
working age population ratio and population size in general. 
 We also consider the effects of migration flows on the working age population 
ratio at a disaggregate level by investigating the demographic trends of specific 
regions in Italy. The different observed behaviours may, in fact, lead to some 
unexpected consequences. In our second hypothesis we focus on two 
demographic dimensions—migrants’ distribution and fertility trends—in order to 
demonstrate a positive relationship between labour migration flows and an 
increasing economic gap between Northern and Southern Italy. 
 Migrants are unevenly distributed among regions in Italy (see Figure 1) with 
more migrants concentrated in the northern regions. It is well known that the most 
attractive areas for migrants are located in the northern part of the country given 
more conducive labour market conditions.5  
 
                                                 
4  The reduction can be moderated by some (endogenous) mechanisms that might also apply. For 
instance, a decrease in the labour force tends to increase both wages and worker participation, 
as it changes the proportion between active and inactive people in a job search. Moreover, it 
can also change the social behaviour and constraints, generating policies that extend the 
statutory retirement age, for example. 
5  The following are considered northern regions: Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Lombardy, Trentino-
Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, 
Marche and Lazio; the South, consists of Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. 
Antonio Golini and Anna Di Bartolomeo 153 
Figure 1: 
Percentage of foreigners in local labour markets, 2007 (per 100 residents) 
 
Source: Albani et al. 2008. 
 
 
 Furthermore, fertility levels among Italian regions have recently begun to 
converge (see Figure 2), which implies that the historical advantage in terms of 
fertility dynamics of southern regions as compared to northern ones is destined to 
disappear in a short time. 
 By combining the heterogeneous distribution of migrants and the recent 
fertility convergence, we expect labour migration flows to have a positive 
economic impact in northern Italy and to increase the geographic differential 
between North and South. 
 To summarise, this paper aims to show that migration significantly 
contributes to the working age population ratio in Italy (and thus potentially to 
economic growth), and that the importance of migration will grow over time in 
the absence of demographic change. Nevertheless, drawbacks may emerge. We 
hypothesise that the unequal distribution of labour migrants and the recent 
convergence of fertility levels across Italian regions risks to exacerbate the 
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economic inequality between the North and South. This study has policy 
implications for managing future migration flows. 
 
Figure 2: 
Period total fertility rate in selected Italian regions, 1952-2008 
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Note: Campania and Sardinia are used as representative of southern Italy, while Liguria and Emilia Romagna 
represent the North. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Istat data, http://demo.istat.it/.  
 
 
3  Data and methods 
Following Golini and Strozza (1998b), in our empirical investigation we estimate 
the impact of international migration on the size and age structure of the 
population between 2007 and 2051 using the residual method. Unlike Golini and 
Strozza (1998b), who consider a retrospective period across different countries, 
we focus exclusively on Italy, forecasting and comparing the potential impact of 
international migration on different regions’ GDP.  
 We adopt the residual method since it enables one to estimate the contribution 
of migration by calculating the difference between the projected population and 
the counterfactual expected population independent of migration flows over the 
projected period. In detail, the closed population (from 2007 until 2051) was 
constructed by subtracting the foreign population and those who acquired Italian 
citizenship (by birth, marriage or naturalisation) from the total resident population 
over the whole period. The difference between the two scenarios represents an 
approximate measure of the demographic contribution of foreign immigrants and 
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their descendants. Nevertheless, this approach has some limitations. Among 
others, Le Bras (1991) stresses that the native population, reduced or increased by 
the absence/presence of migration, could adopt different demographic behaviours 
in reaction to the situation.  
 Data are taken from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat 2008), 
deterministic projections performed by the cohort component model. The base-
year is 2007 and the projection period is 2008-51. For the base year 2007, we 
distinguish foreign population as reported by Istat.  
 Istat makes the following assumptions in forecasting growth through 2051: (1) 
the growth of the total fertility rate is assumed to be constant but low reaching a 
value of 1.53 in 2051 (from 1.37 in 2007); (2) the mean age at childbearing is 
assumed to increase to 33.4 years in 2050 (from 31.0 in 2007); (3) life expectancy 
is assumed to substantially increase to 84.5 years for men and 89.5 for women 
(from 78.6 and 84.1, respectively, in 2007); and (4) annual net international 
migration of approximately 200,000 individuals is assumed; 6  net internal 
migration rate is assumed to remain constant over the entire period.  
 It is worth noting that specific assumptions have been made with regard to the 
foreign population in developing these projections: 
 1. It is expected that the fertility level between foreign and native-born women 
will become more balanced. During the period considered, the TFR is assumed to 
decrease from 2.35 in 2007 to 1.86 in 2050. 
 2. Longevity trends of foreign and Italian populations are also assumed to 
converge given the high proportion of young migrants and the disproportionate 
influence of the Italian healthcare system in shaping health attitudes and 
behaviours.7  
 3. Internal migration is assumed to remain constant among foreigners at three 
times the rate of Italian natives.  
 4. Istat projects that acquisition of Italian citizenship by marriage or 
naturalisation will increase linearly over the projection period; however, different 
rates are assumed according to gender (from 1.0% to 1.2% for men and from 
1.2% to 1.4% for women). Regarding acquisitions by birth, Istat projections 
assume that a constant proportion (0.24) of the children of foreign mothers will 
acquire Italian citizenship over the projection period. This number represents the 
average proportion of children born to foreign-born women and Italian fathers for 
the period between 2002 and 2006.  
                                                 
6  Note that by considering the recent trend of international migration flows, the value assumed is 
quite low; it is based on a broad trust in global improvement of the socio-economic conditions 
of in/out-migration countries. In addition, it is worth noting that all previous studies tended to 
underestimate migration projections. 
7  Nevertheless, recent studies (e.g. Istat 2008c) have confirmed that the foreign population tends 
to adopt less preventative health measures than natives (e.g. in the prevention of breast cancer 
and hypertension) 
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4  Empirical results 
4.1 Aggregate effects 
Figure 3 shows population pyramids for 2007, 2031 and 2051 to highlight the 
aggregate impact of migration on population size and age structure. It shows that 
the contribution of migrations to population size tends to grow over time. Growth 
is particularly concentrated in the working-aged population, as demonstrated by a 
partial delay in the ageing process. 
 
Figure 3: 
Comparison of Italy’s population and age structure with and without migration over 
the projection period. Years 2007, 2031, 2051 (absolute values, positive net migration 
in dark)  
2007 2031 
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2051  
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Istat demographic projections (2008a). 
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 Table 1 describes some age structure indicators for 2007, 2031 and 2051 in 
more detail.  
 
Table 1: 
Population age structure indicators with and without migration over the projection 
period in Italy, 2007, 2031, and 2051 
  % by age groups Absolute values (in millions) 
    0-14 15-64 65+ Total 0-14 15-64 65+ Total 
AR DR 
Population 14.1 66.0 19.9 100.0 8.3 39.0 11.8 59.1 141.7 51.6 
Closed population 13.8 65.3 20.9 100.0 7.7 36.7 11.7 56.2 151.5 53.0 2007 
difference 0.3 0.6 -0.9 0.0 0.6 2.3 0.1 2.9 -9.8 -1.5 
Projected pop. 12.8 60.2 27.0 100.0 7.9 37.4 16.8 62.2 210.2 66.2 
Closed population 11.3 57.8 30.9 100.0 5.8 29.9 16.0 51.7 273.2 73.0 2031 
difference 1.5 2.4 -3.9 0.0 2.1 7.5 0.8 10.5 -63.0 -6.8 
Projected pop. 12.9 54.2 33.0 100.0 7.9 33.4 20.3 61.6 256.3 84.7 
Closed population 11.5 49.6 38.9 100.0 5.3 22.8 17.9 46.0 339.3 101.7 2051 
difference 1.4 4.6 -6.0 0.0 2.6 10.6 2.4 15.6 -83.0 -17.1 
Note: AR = Aged Ratio 100•[P65+/P0-14]; DR = Overall Dependency Ratio 100 · [(P0-14+P65+) / P15-64]. 
Source: Authors’ own computations on Istat demographic projections (2008a). 
 
 Table 1 shows the growing impact of migration on the working age 
population ratio during the projection period (from 0.6% in 2007 to 4.6% in 2051) 
and its effect on population size (from 2.9 million in 2007 to 15.6 million in 2051). 
Dependency ration are expected to grow from -1.5 to -17.1 over the whole period 
while aged ratios are expected to increase from -9.8 to -83.0.  
 We use the GDP decomposition (1) to measure how much massive labour 
migration flows positively impact the age structure, population size and, ceteris 
paribus, the GDP. Holding the productivity trend and the unemployment rate 
constant, we compare two different scenarios. First, we measure the impact of the 
projection of the current trends on the changes in the GDP between 2007 and 
2051 and then we consider a counterfactual situation of projected trends without 
migrations over the projection period. Table 2 shows the estimates of the 
demographic changes on the variation of GDP. 
 Current demographic trends suggest that we can expect a 4% increase in total 
population and an 18% drop in the working age population ratio. As a result, GDP 
will decrease by 15%. In the counterfactual scenario (0 migrants over the 
projection period), the population decreases by 22%, the working age population 
ratio declines by 24% and GDP falls by 41%. Comparing the two scenarios 
(Table 2, rows 1 and 2), the impact of migration on GDP is a decline of 26%-27% 
of which comes from an increase in total population (reversal of population 
decline) and 6% from an increase in the working age population ratio. As 
expected, migration flows largely contribute to Italian national income.  
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Table 2: 
Estimates of the demographic changes on the variations of GDP in Italy (Ratio 
between 2051 and 2007) 
  GDP projected variation 
Working age population 
ratio projected variation
Population projected 
variation 
Population  0.85 0.82 1.04 
Closed population 
(over the projection period) 0.59 0.76 0.78 
difference 0.26 0.06 0.27 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Istat demographic projections (2008a), Istat (2008b) and ConIstat database. 
 
 In order to better understand these results and focus on structural dynamics, 
we perform the same analysis, this time taking into account the long-term effect 
of changes in the working age population ratio on the Italian per capita GDP. We 
rewrite identity (1) as:  
 (2)
 In this case, the impact of migration is still positive, but, as expected, lower 
than in the previous case. In particular, migration decreases the fall of per capita 
GDP by 6%. This result is consistent with Prskawetz et al. (2007), who found that 
eliminating migration effects results in a relatively pronounced decrease in per 
capita income for industrialised countries with a positive net migration.  
 
4.2 Disaggregate effects 
The above analysis was performed on regional data to test our second research 
hypothesis: The positive contribution of international migrations is undesirable at 
the regional level in that it increases the economic gap between the North and the 
South. 
 Figure 4 compares population pyramids with and without migration across 
time in the northern and southern regions. By looking at the 2007 pyramids, some 
differences emerge: in the North the prolonged low-fertility trend is evident from 
a smaller base at younger ages, while the past levels of higher fertility 
experienced by the southern regions have led to a more balanced age structure. In 
2031 the historically higher fertility of the South disappears and a process of 
ageing is evident in both South and North. As expected when fertility dynamics 
converge, population pyramids assume similar shapes. However, when we 
include immigrants’ contribution to the working age population ratio, the 
compositions of population pyramids are take on very different shapes. Similar 
considerations are supported by the age structure in 2051, where the impact of 
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immigrants delays (or partially delays) population ageing in the North, but 
remains nearly insignificant in the South. 
 
Figure 4: 
Comparison of actual and projected population age structure with and without 
migration in the Centre-North and South and Islands regions of Italy in 2007, 2031, 
and 2051. Values reported in percentages (positive net migration in dark)  
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Istat demographic projections (2008a). 
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 These patterns are confirmed by analysing the dynamics of some age-structure 
indicators by geographical area, reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: 
Age structure indicators with and without migration, actual and projected, for 
northern and southern Italy in  2007, 2031, and 2051 
  Proportions by age groups Absolute values (in millions) 
  0-14 15-64 65+ Total 0-14 15-64 65+ Total 
AR DR 
Center-North 
Population 13.2 65.6 21.1 100.0 5.0 25.2 8.1 38.3 159.0 52.4 
Closed population (over 
the projection period) 12.8 64.7 22.6 100.0 4.6 23.1 8.1 35.8 177.3 54.5 2007 
difference 0.5 0.9 -1.4 0.0 0.4 2.1 0.0 2.5 -18.3 -2.1 
Projected population 12.8 60.4 26.8 100.0 5.4 25.6 11.3 42.3 208.9 65.5 
Closed population (over 
the projection period) 10.6 57.1 32.3 100.0 3.5 18.8 10.6 32.9 305.0 75.2 2031 
difference 2.2 3.3 -5.5 0.0 1.9 6.8 0.7 9.4 -96.1 -9.7 
Projected population 13.0 55.2 31.8 100.0 5.7 24.0 13.8 43.5 243.5 81.2 
Closed population (over 
the projection period) 11.0 49.0 39.8 99.8 3.2 14.3 11.6 29.2 358.5 103.9 2051 
difference 2.0 6.2 -8.0 0.2 2.5 9.7 2.2 14.3 -115.0 -22.7 
South and Islands 
Population 15.6 66.8 17.6 100.0 3.2 13.8 3.7 20.8 113.0 49.8 
Closed population (over 
the projection period) 15.6 66.5 17.9 100.0 3.1 13.6 3.7 20.4 114.7 50.3 2007 
difference 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 -1.7 -0.5 
Projected population 12.9 59.6 27.5 100.0 2.6 11.8 5.5 19.9 212.9 67.9 
Closed population (over 
the projection period) 12.6 59.0 28.4 100.0 2.4 11.1 5.4 18.9 226.3 69.4 2031 
difference 0.3 0.6 -0.9 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.0 -13.4 -1.5 
Projected population 12.4 51.7 35.9 100.0 2.2 9.3 6.5 18.1 288.8 93.6 
Closed population (over 
the projection period) 12.1 50.1 37.4 100.0 2.0 8.4 6.2 16.7 308.5 98.0 2051 
difference 0.3 1.6 -1.5 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.3 1.4 -19.7 -4.4 
Note: AR = Aged Ratio 100 · [P65+/P0-14];  DR = Dependency Ratio 100 · [(P0-14+P65+) / P15-64]. 
Source: Authors’ own computations on Istat demographic projections (2008a). 
  
The table underscores the high contribution of migrants in augmenting the 
working age population ratio in the North: from 0.9% in 2007 to 6.2% in 2051, 
compared to a much less pronounced change in southern regions where the ratio 
ranges from 0.3% in 2007 to 1.2% in 2051. A similar differential occurs with 
respect to total population, with total population in the North attributable to 
migration increasing from 2.5 million in 2007 to 14.3 million in 2051. In the 
South the impact of migration is minimal, with total effect of migration increasing 
from 0.4 in 2007 to 1.4 million in 2051. The different role played by migration 
flows among Italian regions significantly affects overall dependency and age 
ratios as well.  
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 Using Equation (1), Table 4 shows the impact of migration on GDP changes 
in the North and South, assuming that productivity and unemployment rate 
remain constant. 
 
Table 4: 
Estimates of demographic changes on GDP variations (2007-2051), northern and 
southern Italy 
 GDP projected variation 
Working age population 
ratio projected variation
Population projected 
variation 
Center-North 
Population  0.95 0.84 1.13 
Closed population 
(over the projection period) 0.57 0.75 0.76 
difference 0.38 0.09 0.37 
South and Islands 
Population  0.68 0.78 0.87 
Closed population 
(over the projection period) 0.61 0.76 0.81 
difference 0.07 0.02 0.06 
Source: Own elaboration on Istat demographic projections (2008a), Istat (2008b) and ConIstat database. 
 
 
 In the North, the combined effect of a 16% decrease in the working age 
population ratio and a 13% increase in population causes a 5% fall in the GDP. In 
the closed population scenario, the working age population ratio decreases by 
25%, the total population by 24% and the GDP by 43%. Thus, the overall impact 
of migrations in decreasing the GDP is 38%, due to a 37% reduction in the fall of 
the population and a 9% reduction in the fall of the working age population ratio.  
 As expected, the impact of migration is relatively low in the South. 
Migrations contribute to a differential of only 7% between the two scenarios. In 
the basic scenario, which includes migration, the fall in the working age 
population ratio (22%) and the decline of the total population (13%) contribute to 
a decrease of 32% in GDP.  In the counterfactual scenario, projected without 
migration, the decline of the working age population ratio (24%) and population 
size (19%) cause a fall of 39% in GDP. The 7% increase in GDP caused by 
migration is due to a 2% net change in WAPR and the 6% change in the total 
population). Clearly, the impact of international migration is more pronounced in 
the North than in the Southern area.  
 We also estimate the impact of migration on per capita GDP, using identity (2) 
above. Our findings confirm that the role played by large-scale migration differs 
according to region. Indeed, in the North migration reduces the negative impact 
on per capita GDP by 9% while the impact is negligible (1%) in the South.  
 In summary, by isolating the economic impact of the working age population 
ratio on the GDP, our analysis shows that migration may be considered a resource 
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in the North where migrants tend to assume stronger importance over time. 
Conversely, the impact of migration is significantly limited in the South. 
Therefore, the economic issues and policies linked to population ageing ought to 
account for differential impact in the North and South.  
 All of our projections are based on the assumption of a relatively low annual 
net migration rate compared to that which has been observed in the recent years. 
Thus the potential contribution of migrants to economic activity is underestimated, 
and will likely be larger amidst migratory policies which induce labour migration 
flows. Moreover, we can always expect that fewer people will enter the labour 
market and that migrants also age, so the discussion about quotas thus cannot be 
made once and forgotten but must take into account the dynamics of the 
population structure. In the medium to long-term, increasing flows are needed to 
avoid future holes in the population pyramid, especially if there is not a strong 
change in the population dynamics.   
 The positive effects of migration flows may be an opportunity to improve the 
standard of living, though only in northern regions leading to an increase in the 
structural gap between the North and South. In this respect, our findings provide a 
new, unexpected role for migration in the current policy debate surrounding the 
issue of federalism.  
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the impact of immigration flows on population structure, 
specifically the working age population ratio. We also isolate the working age 
population ratio from other GDP determinants, emphasising the role of 
international migrations, in supporting economic growth. Immigration flows have 
an immediate effect on national income by increasing the labour force and 
supporting the participation rate. 
 Along a simple demographic-economic chain, immigration supports 
population size and the working age population ratio (and by extension the GDP). 
Migrations become necessary to avoid “gaps” in the population pyramid and 
declines in the active population. Moreover, since we can expect that ever fewer 
people will enter the labour market and that permanent migrants will also age, 
labour migrant flows have to be maintained or must gradually increase to balance 
the effects of migrants’ own demographic trends, thus avoiding future deficits in 
the working ages and substituting aged migrants. The scenario presented above 
stresses that growing immigration flows should eventually be encouraged when 
looking at current fertility trends as well as other variables, such as productivity 
and unemployment. 
 Although immigration is a potential resource for the future economic welfare, 
we find that it may have some relevant shortcomings that policy-makers must 
face. Certain conditions should be met to transform unchecked migration into an 
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effective resource. Accordingly, integration policies not only have a social value, 
but an economic value as integrated migrants will have the same (perhaps greater) 
productivity as natives and will support economic growth. Bad integration 
policies can, instead, have counter-productive effects. 
 By disaggregating the demographic trends at macro regional levels, we also 
stress a further potential problem: due to the higher concentration of migrants in 
the North and the fall of the fertility advantage in the South, migration benefits 
will be unevenly distributed, increasing the problem of North-South GDP 
differentials. This may result in demographic conditions which create a poverty 
trap within the southern regions. Nevertheless, North-South differentials may be 
overestimated since the GDP regional estimates do not account for the 
underground economy which also likely affects the two regions differently. 
 In conclusion, migration must be taken into account in the debate over 
national income dynamics and GDP differentials between North and South, 
Without relevant changes in childbearing behaviours, both economic issues and 
migratory policies have to be intertwined at the national and regional level in 
order to guarantee that migration persists in being an economic resource and not a 
problem to solve. 
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